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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with eight counts of burglary, five counts of grand theft, and three
counts of petit theft, Marissa Dempsey exercised her constitutional right to a jury trial. She was
found guilty as charged, and received an aggregate sentence of fourteen years, with five years
fixed.
On appeal, Ms. Dempsey contends that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish
Count XII, Grand Theft, where the State did not meet its burden to prove the value of the items
was $1,000 or more. Ms. Dempsey respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court's
judgment of conviction as to Count XII and remand this case for resentencing on petit theft.
Ms. Dempsey further asserts that in its closing arguments, the prosecution committed
misconduct by: asking the jury to decide the case based on its fear for the safety of the
community should it not convict Ms. Dempsey-attempting to inflame the passions and
prejudices of the jury; improperly bolstering the testimony of its witnesses by offering a personal
opinion on their credibility and disparaging the defense's theory of the case, and diminishing the
State's burden of proof

Although these errors are unpreserved, they rise to the level of

fundamental error. Due to these errors, Ms. Dempsey respectfully requests that this Court vacate
her judgment of conviction and remand her case for new trial.
Ms. Dempsey also asserts that the district court erred in awarding restitution for items
taken and not recovered because the State did not present sufficient evidence at the restitution
hearing regarding either the market value of the items at the time and place of the crime, or the
replacement cost of the items within a reasonable time after the crime.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Between March 29, 2017 and May 3, 2017, eight residential thefts were reported in such
a proximity and circumstances that law enforcement believed they were related. (Tr., p.342,
L.15 - p.344, L.2; Exhibit 55.) Often the homeowners' pillowcases were missing from their
bedroom, leading police to believe the thief was putting valuables into the empty pillowcases.
(Tr., p.196, Ls.9-11; p.218, Ls.13-18; p.292, Ls.10-11.) A neighbor driving by one house saw a
car they didn't recognize as belonging to the homeowners parked outside and then picked
Marissa Dempsey out of a line-up as the person standing by the car on the day the items were
taken from the house. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.24 - p.169, L.11; p.170, L.3 - p.172, L.8.) One
person who reported some property missing had encountered a bluish-green car with a woman
and her child parked in her driveway that day. (Trial Tr., p.393, L.14 - p.394, L.25.) She spoke
to them for approximately ten minutes before going inside her house and discovering that a sack
of dollar coins was missing from a bedroom. (Trial Tr., p.309, Ls.16-25; p.398, L.10 - p.399,
L.24.) She identified Ms. Dempsey as the woman she spoke with that day. (Tr., p.398, Ls.IO20.)
After law enforcement learned that Ms. Dempsey had rented a storage unit, they obtained
a warrant to search the unit. (Tr., p.352, Ls.1-20.) Several items related to the reports of missing
property were found in the storage shed. 1 (Tr., p.355, L.19 - p.356, L.13; p.362, Ls.1-8.) A red
coin purse identified as belonging to one of the homeowners was found in Ms. Dempsey's car. 2

1

Ms. Dempsey had removed the lock on the shed when she stopped using it in January of 2017,
thus it was accessible to anyone. (Tr., p.362, Ls. 9-25; p.519, L.16 - p.521, L.2.)
2
Ms. Dempsey testified that she allowed friends to borrow her car. (Tr., p.450, L.18 - p.451,
L.4; p.461, Ls.19-22.) Items belonging to the victims of these burglaries were also located in a
vehicle belonging to Jamie Shores; however, only Ms. Dempsey was charged regarding these
burglaries. (Trial Tr., p.327, L.21 - p.329, L.18; p.350, Ls.10-17.)
2

(Tr., p.324, Ls.9-17; p.333, Ls.17-22.) Based on these facts, Ms. Dempsey was charged by
Information with eight counts of burglary, five counts of grand theft, and three counts of petit
theft. (R., pp.36-41.)
Ms. Dempsey exercised her constitutional right to a jury trial. At trial, the jury heard
testimony from three individuals who spoke to a woman at or near the homes where items were
missing. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.16-p.185, L.17; p.305, L.1 -p.315, L.19; p.393, L.1 -p.407, L.2.)
The jury heard the testimony of the individuals who were missing items from their homes and
their testimony of the value of the items taken. (See Trial Tr., p.166, L.16-p.406, L.25.)
When discussing the offenses during her closing remarks to the jury, the prosecutor
repeatedly told the jurors of the violation to the victims, and that they needed to ensure
community safety by convicting Ms. Dempsey.

(Trial Tr., p.621, L.23 - p.638, L.9.) The

prosecutor said, inter alia, in her rebuttal closing, "This is the part where some justice for the
victim, where evaluation of the evidence, where making our community safer is out ofmy hands
and into yours." (Trial Tr., p.659, Ls.16-19.) The jury found Ms. Dempsey guilty as charged.
(Trial Tr., p.663, L.3 - p.671, L.18; R., pp.127-29; Aug., pp.76-91.)
At Ms. Dempsey's sentencing hearing, the State recommended a sentence of forty years,
with fifteen years fixed. (Trial Tr., p.724, Ls.21-25.) Ms. Dempsey's counsel asked the court to
sentence her to twenty-four years, with two years fixed. (Trial Tr., p.733, Ls.7-9.) The district
court then sentenced her to ten years, with five years fixed, on each of the burglary convictions.
(Tr., p.741, Ls.13-17; R., pp.137-141.) Ms. Dempsey was sentenced to fourteen years, with five
years fixed on the five grand theft charges. (Tr., p.741, Ls.17-20; R., p.138.) Ms. Dempsey was
sentenced to one year in county jail on the three petit theft charges.
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(Tr., p.741, Ls.20-22;

R., p.138.) The sentences on all counts were ordered to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.741,
Ls.22-24; R., p. 138.)
Ms. Dempsey objected to the restitution sought by the State. (R., pp.142-143.) Two
hearings were held; thereafter, the district court ordered $124,839.01 in restitution.

(Aug.,

pp.111-117.) Ms. Dempsey also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion
seeking leniency from the district court.

(Aug., pp.92-99.) The motion was denied after a

hearing. (Aug., p.110.) Ms. Dempsey filed a Notice of Appeal timely from her judgment of
conviction, the denial of her Rule 35 motion, and the restitution order. (R., pp.189-191, 205207.)

4

ISSUES
I.

Was there sufficient evidence to convict Ms. Dempsey of Count XII, Grand Theft?

II.

Did the State commit prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments?

III.

Did the district court err in awarding restitution where the amount ordered was not based
on substantial and competent evidence?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That
Ms. Dempsey Committed Count XII Grand Theft
A.

Introduction
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Ms. Dempsey committed Count XII

Grand Theft, where the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the
property was $1,000. The jury heard testimony pertaining to Count XII Grand Theft that the
owner of property was missing World War II mementos and jewelry. (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.1-19.)
When asked the value of these items, the State elicited a response indicating that the items were
priceless to their owner. (Trial Tr., p.278, Ls.20-24.) The owner then said, "6 to 10,000 perhaps,
I don't know." (Trial Tr., p.279, L. 1.) The State established no value on the items taken. At
best, the State elicited a guess from the items' owner. Such was insufficient to establish, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the value of the items taken exceeded $1,000. In light of these facts, the
State failed to meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Dempsey committed
Count XII Grand Theft.

B.

Standard Of Review
In State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals outlined the

appellate standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding
of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its
burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998);
State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991). We will
not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences
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to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001;
State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303,304 (Ct.App.1985). Moreover,
we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,
822 P .2d at 1001. Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence
presented is solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009); State v. Stevens, 93
Idaho 48, 50-51, 454 P.2d 945, 947--48 (1969). In fact, even when circumstantial
evidence could be interpreted consistently with a finding of innocence, it will be
sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to reasonable
inferences of guilt. Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432; State v. Slawson,
124 Idaho 753,757,864 P.2d 199,203 (Ct.App.1993).
158 Idaho at 177-78.

C.

The Evidence Was Insufficient To Prove Count XII Grand Theft Because The State
Failed To Prove The Value Of The Property Was $1,000 Or More
The Information alleged that Ms. Dempsey committed Grand Theft, a violation of

I.C. § 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(1 )(b)(1) by:
COUNT XII
That the Defendant, MARISSA SHANNEL DEMPSEY, on or about the
27th day of April, 2017, in the County of Elmore, State ofldaho, while having the
intent to deprive the owner of property or to appropriate the same to herself or to a
third person, did wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property, to-wit: Defendant
took several pieces of jewelry, jewelry boxes, purses and/or other household
items, from Joanne Colwell, the owner thereof, where the value of said property
exceeded $1,000.00 in United States currency, all in violation of LC. §§ 182403(1) and 18-2407(1 )(b )(1 ).

(R., p.39.) The theft statute reads: "A person steals property and commits theft when, with
intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof" I.C. § 18-2403(1).
A person commits grand theft statute when he commits a theft as defined in this chapter and
when "The value of the property taken exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000)." LC. § 182407(1 )(b)(1 ).
The jury was instructed on "value" as follows:
7

The term "value" as used in these instructions means the market value of the
property at the time and place of the crime, or if the market value cannot be
satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a
reasonable time after the crime.
(Aug., p.65 (JI NO. 59).) This instruction is consistent with Idaho law. The statutory definition
of "value" applicable to theft cases is:
[V]alue means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime,
or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the
property within a reasonable time after the crime.
I.C. § 18-2402(1 l)(a); State v. Vargas, 152 Idaho 240, 242-43 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that, for
theft cases, if the market value cannot be established, value is to be determined by the cost to
replace the property within a reasonable period of time after the crime).
Here the jury was required to fmd the value of the property was over $1,000. LC. § 182407(1)(b)(l). However, it was limited by the market value of the items or even the costs of
replacement. LC. § 18-2402(1 l)(a). This it could not do where the State failed to produce
evidence of the value of the property allegedly taken as charged in Count XII Grand Theft. As
such, the jury's verdict was not based upon substantial evidence.
Due to the insufficient evidence of Count XII Grand Theft, the verdict is invalid. The
insufficient evidence of Count XII Grand Theft requires that the judgment of conviction be
reduced to a misdemeanor, petit theft, unless other claimed errors raised by Ms. Dempsey in this
appeal necessitate a new trial for that charge. See State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 264 (Ct. App.
2010).
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II.
The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct In Closing Arguments

A.

Introduction
Ms. Dempsey asserts that her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, was violated when the prosecutor, in closing arguments, inflamed the passions and
prejudices of the jury, lowered the State's burden of proof and bolstered three State's witnesses'
testimony. Ms. Dempsey asserts that the prosecutor's improper closing arguments denied her a
fair trial. Although this error is unpreserved, these constitutional violations are clear from the
record and actually affected the trial's outcome.

In light of these errors, Ms. Dempsey

respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction and remand her case for a
new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
A conviction will be set aside for unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct only if the

misconduct is sufficiently egregious to constitute fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho
132, 141 (2014). For unobjected-to errors, the Court applies the fundamental error standard:
Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of
persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object
was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
This Court recently clarified prongs two and three of this standard in State v. Miller, No. 46517,

9

2019 WL 1217673 (Mar. 15, 2019) (substitute opinion). To satisfy prong two, this Court held
that the defendant must point to "evidence in the record" to support the claim that trial counsel's
failure to object was not a 8 tactical decision. Miller, No. 46517, at p.3. To satisfy prong three,
this Court held that the defendant must demonstrate that the clear error "actually affected the
outcome of the trial proceedings." Miller, No. 46517, at p.4. Ms. Dempsey acknowledges that
she did not contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's statements and thus the statements
must be evaluated as fundamental error.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Closing Arguments By Attempting To Inflame
The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury, Asking Them To Decide The Case On
Something Other Than The Law And The Evidence Presented At Trial, Lowering The
State's Burden Of Proof, Bolstering The Testimony Of Several State's Witnesses, And
Expressing Her Personal Opinion Regarding Both The Defense's Theory Of The Case
And The Truthfulness Of The State's Witnesses
"[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due
process."' Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n ]o person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly,
the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Additionally, the
Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal
trials to be fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial
misconduct may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
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due process. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318
(Ct. App. 2005). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct
must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219
(1982). The aim of due process is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. Id.
“Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they
will give to counsel for the accused.”

State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, ___, 71 P. 608, 611

(1903). The prosecutor’s duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only
competent evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id.
The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set
forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted at trial, including reasonable inferences
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.”
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. “Indeed, the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the
facts and unnecessarily inflammatory tactics.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)
(internal punctuation marks omitted). “Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.”
(Ct. App. 2008).

State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20

Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State’s burden to prove the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho
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758, 769 (1993); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).

"It is improper to

misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence in closing argument." Moses, 156 Idaho at 871
(quoting State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2013)). Nor should closing argument
include counsel's personal opinion about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of
the accused.

State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979).

Although a prosecutor has

considerable latitude in conducting closing arguments and can argue all reasonable inferences
from the evidence, a prosecutor should avoid expressing a personal belief as to the credibility of
the witnesses unless the comment is based solely on the evidence. State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710,
715 (Ct. App. 2003).
Misrepresentations or diminishments of the State's burden to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993);

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).

1.

The Prosecutor Sought To Convict Ms. Dempsey Not On The Proof Adduced At
Trial, But Through The Jury's Passions And Prejudices When The Prosecutor
Told The Jury They Must Convict Ms. Dempsey To Keep Their Community Safe

In Idaho, it is well-recognized that prosecutors may not utilize emotional appealswhether they be appeals to sympathy, fear, anger, or any other emotions-in their closing
arguments to juries. See, e.g., State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 575-76 (Ct. App. 2007); State v.

Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Here, ... the prosecutor's
appeal to the jurors' emotions was overt and express, conveying not simply that the witness's
testimony was implausible or lacking credibility, but that jurors ought to respond to the
testimony with irritation and resentment. Such appeals to emotion during closing argument are
plainly improper."); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367 (Ct. App. 1998) (the prosecutor's
statement that the defendant was a "[ drug] dealer to your sons and daughters" "was an improper
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reference to the jurors' families and hypothesized the commission of a crime against them. . . .
This type of hypothesis is an appeal to jurors' fears, not a 'fact' proven by the evidence nor a
reasonable inference based upon the evidence. Therefore it is not a proper consideration for the
jury's decision or for counsel's argument."); State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 819 (Ct. App. 1992)
(noting that it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a question of an alleged victim in order to
generate sympathy for that person).
The United States Supreme Court decision in Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236
(1943) can serve as guidance for determining whether a prosecutor intended his comments to
incite prejudice and passion in the jury. United State v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 406 (2001).
The prosecutor in Viereck urged the jury as follows:
In closing, let me remind you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is war. This is war, harsh,
cruel, murderous war. There are those who, right at this very moment, are plotting your
death and my death; plotting our death and the death of our families because we have
committed no other crime than that we do not agree with their ideas of persecution and
concentration camps. This is war. It is a fight to the death. The American people are
relying on you ladies and gentlemen for their protection against this sort of a crime, just
as much they are relying upon the protection of the Men who man the guns in Bataan
Peninsula, and everywhere else. They are relying upon you ladies and gentlemen for their
protection. We are at war. You have a duty to perform here.
As a representative of your Government I am calling upon every one of you to do your
duty.
Viereck, 318 U.S. at 247 n. 3.

One hundred and two years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used similar
reasoning to explain why inflammatory emotional pleas are still deemed to be improper:
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant
in order to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter
future law-breaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals
is that the defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant
to his own guilt or innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such
appeals to believe that, by convicting a defendant, they will assist
in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration
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of society’s woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual
criminal defendant to bear.
. . . Weatherspoon’s guilt at trial depended entirely on proof that he was in
possession of a gun at the time that the car was pulled over. Those prosecutorial
urgings—especially the later ones encouraging a conviction to protect other
individuals in the community—spoke not to that question, but rather to the
potential social ramifications of the jury’s reaching a guilty verdict. They were
clearly designed to encourage the jury to enter a verdict on the basis of emotion
rather than fact. As such, they were irrelevant and improper.
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434,
1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). Weatherspoon was a case in which the defendant was charged with
being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm; portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument
focused on the personal comfort and community safety which is attendant to taking armed excons off the streets. Id. at 1149. The Ninth Circuit held that, “[t]hat entire line of argument . . .
was improper.” Id. Then, after quoting the above language from Koon and Monaghan, it
observed that since Mr. Weatherspoon’s case turned solely on the question of whether he had, in
fact, been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the prosecutor’s arguments about
the “potential social ramifications of the jury’s reaching a guilty verdict,” were “irrelevant and
improper“ because “[t]hey were clearly designed to encourage the jury to enter a verdict on the
basis of emotion rather than fact.” Id. at 1149-1150.
Arguments for a conviction in order to protect the public and the rights of victims are
outside the boundaries of proper closing arguments.

Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576 (finding

prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor’s closing argument highlighted concerns about
the protection of the public at-large, as well as concerns for the rights of victims and concluding
that the prosecutor's comments about protecting the public and rights of victims was not
harmless because the state’s evidence against the defendant was far from overwhelming); State v.
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Baruth, 107 Idaho 651, 656-57 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the

prosecutor argued that "the entire criminal justice system" was on trial and that the jury was "the
only thing standing between the people of this community and [the defendant] robbing or doing
anything else he chooses to anyone else in the community") The relevant question then becomes
whether the prosecutor's comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).
Nevertheless, the prosecutor in Ms. Dempsey's case delivered a closing argument
designed to appeal to the jury's sympathies for the victims and to prey upon its fears for
community safety. The prosecutor told the jury about one victim's testimony, "[y]ou saw her get
choked up at a picture of her home ... And as she entered her bedroom, and I don't know about
you, but to me, my bedroom that is my safe place. I want to believe that is my safe place."
(Trial Tr., p.621, L.24 - p.622, L.5.) Some minutes later, the prosecutor said, "Again, a part of
the home that is supposed to be sacrosanct, that is supposed to be safe, that is supposed to not be
violated by a stranger." (Trial Tr., p.627, Ls.11-13.) She discussed at length the impact on the
victims:
Insecure in their own homes. Get emotional when they see pictures of what
happened to their home on the day of the burglary. You cannot recover
irreplaceable family heirlooms that have been handed down through generations.
And you are going to have feelings about that even if they aren't worth
anything ... The victims are never ever going to forget the day they walked into
their homes and found out that they had been violated. Someone had gone in their
inner sanctuary, in their bedroom, and stolen things of value, both monetary and
worse, sentimental, irreplaceable items. They will never forget that. They will
never stop double-checking their doors. They are never going to stop wondering
why the garage door is open when they thought they shut it.
(Trial Tr., p.636, L.9 -p.637, L.4)
The prosecutor then told the jury it needed to hold Ms. Dempsey accountable:
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We need to protect the community. We need to protect this place we live and
work in. We need to protect future potential victims. And we can do that. We
are in a unique opportunity to hold someone accountable that will hopefully tell
the rest of the county that this is not okay. And even a hard case where we have
to do some dot connecting is going to go to trial, if necessary, to hold someone
accountable for violating people's homes.
(Trial Tr., p.637, Ls.9-18) (emphasis added.) The prosecutor said, "I am going to ask you to hold
the defendant accountable. I am going to ask you to review the evidence and ask you to return a

verdict of guilty." (Trial Tr., p.638, Ls.6-9) (emphasis added.)
The prosecutor then placed the duty to protect the community, to keep it safe, upon the
jury by telling them that it was up to them to protect the community. The prosecutor said in
conclusion, "This is the part where some justice for the victim[s], where evaluation of the
evidence, where making our community safer is out of my hands and into yours. Thank you
very much." (Trial Tr., p.659, Ls.16-19.) She told the jury that it was the jury's responsibility to
make the community safer by convicting Ms. Dempsey. However, the prosecutor's directives to
the jury asked the jury to find Ms. Dempsey guilty in order to protect the community were an
appeal to the emotions of the jurors, to their passions and prejudices-their fear. She was not
asking the jury to convict Ms. Dempsey because the State had proved its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, but that it was to convict Ms. Dempsey to make the community safer and
because of their sympathy for the victims.

2.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct When It Bolstered The Credibility Of
Three State's Witnesses

Closing argument should not include counsel's personal opinion about the credibility of a
witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11 (1979).
Although a prosecutor has considerable latitude in conducting closing arguments and can argue
all reasonable inferences from the evidence, a prosecutor should avoid expressing a personal
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belief as to the credibility of the witnesses unless the comment is based solely on the evidence.
State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715 (Ct. App. 2003).

Here, one individual identified Ms. Dempsey in a law enforcement line-up as a person
they spoke with around the time items went missing. (Trial Tr., p.172, Ls.1-8; p.175, Ls.11-15;
p.180, Ls.9-17.) The prosecutor bolstered the testimony of two eyewitnesses, "Mikki Zito has no
dog in the fight. Marty Siegwein didn't lose anything but fixing a couple of doors. No dog in
the fight." 3

(Tr., p.635, Ls.10-12.)

The prosecution's statements improperly bolstered the

testimony of its witnesses, which violated Ms. Dempsey's right to due process and a fair trial.
The prosecutor's remarks surrounding the bolstering of these witnesses' testimony also
mischaracterized defense counsel's argument, included expressions of her personal opinion, and
appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury.

After making the "dog" remarks, the

prosecutor then put the weight of her office behind these witnesses' testimony, telling the jury
that she was personally offended that their credibility would be challenged. (Trial Tr., p.657,
Ls.10-23.) She told jurors she found it "a little disturbing" that a law enforcement witness was
being accused of witness tampering, "that he is being accused of pointing out whom he wants an
eye witness to identify. And I find it disturbing that the three people, again, two of which had no
dog in the fight whatsoever really, one that lost 20 bucks worth of coins, their honesty and their
integrity who identified her from the lineup is being questioned." (Trial Tr., p.657, Ls.10-20)
(emphasis added.) The prosecutor then mischaracterized defense counsel's argument a second
time, and expressed her personal opinion again, saying "I don't believe the evidence showed that

3

Although it is accurate the Ms. Zito was not a victim in this case, the prosecutor's statement
regarding Mr. Siegwein's uninvolvement was inaccurate where his rental house sustained
damage from a break-in. The doorframe was broken and his tenant's property was subsequently
found in Ms. Dempsey's storage shed. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.1-15.)
17

all four of those people are lying about that eye witness identification." (Trial Tr., p.657, Ls.2123) (emphasis added.)
Here, the prosecutor's appeal to the jurors' emotions was overt and express, conveying
not simply that the witnesses' testimony was truthful based on the evidence, but that jurors ought
to respond to the defense's theory of the case presented through cross-examination and closing
remarks with irritation and resentment. Such appeals to emotion during closing argument are
plainly improper. See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87.

3.

The Prosecutor's Misconduct Constitutes Fundamental Error Requiring This
Court To Vacate Ms. Dempsey's Conviction

Ms. Dempsey did not object to the prosecutor's improper arguments; however, she
asserts that the prosecutor's argument amounts to fundamental error necessitating this Court to
vacate her conviction. "Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho
appellate courts may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in
question qualifies as fundamental error[.]" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).

"Such

review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of persuading the
appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 228. Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court
"reemphasize[d] that in order to satisfy [the second Perry prong] a defendant bears the burden of
showing clear error in the record," meaning "must contain evidence of the error and the record
must also contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to
object." State v. Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673, at *2 (Idaho Mar. 15, 2019). Miller
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changed the fundamental error analysis with respect to the second and third prongs of the test.
Regarding the second prong-the requirement that the error be clear from the record-the Court
wrote, "This means the record must contain evidence of the error and the record must also
contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object."
Id. at *2. It went on to state, "[W]e clarify that whether trial counsel made a tactical decision in

failing to object is a claim that must be supported by evidence in the record." Id. Where the
record contains no "evidence regarding whether counsel's decision was strategic, the claim is
factual in nature and thus more appropriately addressed via a petition for post-conviction relief."
Id. Further, whereas a defendant previously satisfied Perry's third prong by "proving there is a

reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial," Miller "clarified" that the
appellate record must establish that the unpreserved error "actually affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings." Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673, at *2 (emphasis added).

a.

The Prosecutor's Misconduct Violated Ms. Dempsey's Constitutional
Rights

The United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that "the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970). "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
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With respect to due process, the United States Supreme Court has explained why the
prosecutor cannot vouch for a witness’s credibility or express a personal opinion of the
defendant’s guilt, stating:
The prosecutor’s vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing his
personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two dangers: such
comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but
known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus
jeopardize the defendant’s right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment
rather than its own view of the evidence.
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 721 (2011) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19
(1985)).
“[P]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental error
only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice could not
have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the comments should
be disregarded.” State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 565 (Ct. App. 2001)); State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146 (2014)
(holding that prosecutorial misconduct was not fundamental error where improper statements
about nightmares or child suffering were not made or dwelled upon in support of a harsher
punishment and did not misrepresent the evidence that was presented to the jury.) “It follows
that a misstatement to a jury of the State’s burden rises to the level of fundamental error because
it goes to the foundation of the case and would take away from a defendant a right essential to
his or her defense.”

State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding the

prosecutor’s distortion of the State’s burden of proof in closing argument was fundamental error
and highly prejudicial).
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It was misconduct for the prosecutor to tell the jurors that they must convict

Ms. Dempsey in order to keep their community safe; lower its burden to prove the charges
beyond a reasonable doubt; bolster the testimony of several State's witnesses; tell the jury of her
opinions on the State's witnesses' credibility; and attempt to secure a guilty verdict by improper
means.

Ms. Dempsey asserts that her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Fifth and the

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution, was violated by the prosecutor's misrepresentation of the State's burden of proof
and the law during closing arguments.
Here, the prosecutor told the jury her own, personal opinion on the credibility of the
State's witnesses, urged them to feel upset with defense counsel for suggesting that the
identifications of Ms. Dempsey could be erroneous, and called upon the jury to convict
Ms. Dempsey in order to keep their community safe. The prosecutor's misconduct violated
Ms. Dempsey's due process right to a fair trial.

b.

The Error Is Clear From The Record Because The Record Shows The
Failure To Object Was Not Strategic Or Tactical

Next, this error is clear from the record. Ms. Dempsey has met her burden to show plain
error under Miller. The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no
reason to believe that Ms. Dempsey's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to
object to the prosecutor's appeals to the jury's passions and prejudices, lowering its burden of
proof and by bolstering the testimony of its eyewitnesses by expressing her personal opinion of
the defense's theory and the State's witnesses' credibility.
Moreover, there is no legitimate strategic or tactical reason for defense counsel to choose
not to object to such evidence. No reasonable jurist would want this evidence before the jury
because this evidence allows the jury to find Ms. Dempsey guilty absent proof beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Further, because the record reveals no objectively reasonable basis not to
object to such a blatant distortion and diminution of the State's burden, the record shows that
trial counsel's failure to object was not tactical. Further, evidence in the record demonstrates
Ms. Dempsey's counsel did not make a tactical decision not to object. Ms. Dempsey's defense
has consistently focused on the identification of Ms. Dempsey as the person in the area. For
example, in his opening remarks, Ms. Dempsey's counsel discussed the legitimacy of the
witnesses' identifications of Ms. Dempsey. (See Trial Tr., p.164, L.13 - p.165, L.4.) At the
conclusion of the trial, in his closing remarks defense counsel talked again about the problems
with the witnesses' identifications. (See Trial Tr., p.649, L.2 - p.651, L.3.)
In summary, because Ms. Dempsey's counsel maintained a consistent theory of the case,
and the prosecutor's comments in closing were blatantly improper and denigrating to the
defense's theory, the record clearly shows defense counsel's failure to object was not strategic or
tactical.

Reasonable counsel would not permit the prosecutor's improper arguments which

denigrated the defense, required the jury to convict Ms. Dempsey to protect the community, and
placed the imprimatur of the State on her opinions regarding the eyewitnesses' identifications of
Ms. Dempsey. Therefore, under Miller, Ms. Dempsey has met her burden to show the error
plainly exists.
c.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Actually Affected The Trial's Outcome

Finally, the State's evidence against Ms. Dempsey was tenuous. The State even told the
jury that this case required it to "connect-the-dots."4 (Trial Tr., p.629, Ls.3-17; p.639, L.23 -

4

The prosecutor told the jury at closing:
I understand that I am asking you to make some connections. Easy cases don't go
to trial. There is [sic] two reasons. If the evidence is perfect, defendant will
usually agree to plead guilty for some sort of favorable sentencing
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p.640, L.3.) The only evidence the State had to prove Ms. Dempsey's presence at the location of
the burglaries was the eyewitnesses' identification of her. Mikki Zito chose Ms. Dempsey's
photo from a six-pack, a group of six photographs shown to her by law enforcement. 5 (Trial
Tr., p.172, Ls.1-8; p.175, Ls.11-15; p.180, Ls.9-17.)

However, neither Ms. Zito nor

Mr. Siegwein could positively identify Ms. Dempsey in the courtroom. (Trial Tr., p.172, Ls.513; p.180, Ls.14-21.)

Only Traci Curry was able to make an in-court identification of

Ms. Dempsey. (Trial Tr., p.398, Ls.10-20.) Like Mr. Siegwein, Ms. Curry testified that she had
chosen a person out of the law enforcement administered six-pack lineup, but never identified
which photo she chose or who that photo depicted. (Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.2-1; p.397, Ls.7-12;
p.400, L.13 -p.401, L.1.)
As such, this case came down to a credibility determination-did the jury believe the
State's inconsistent eyewitnesses, or did the jury believe Ms. Dempsey's testimony that she was
in Boise, a forty-minute drive away, at the time these burglaries took place? (Trial Tr., p.431,
L. 18 - 441, L.3.) As such, it is clearly improper that at closing arguments, the prosecutor
bolstered the testimony of its witnesses by telling the jury that these individuals had "no dog in
the fight" and that the law enforcement witness would be risking his job if he lied. Further, the
prosecutor told the jury her personal opinion, expressing outrage at the defense's theory of the

recommendation from my office. If the evidence is terrible or doesn't support the
charge, I obviously have a very different decision that I have to make. Sometimes
we get cases that require us to connect the dots ... But this is a connect-the-dots
case. Traci Curry's purse began connecting the dots.
(Trial Tr., p.629, Ls.3-17.)
5
In fact, Mr. Siegwein testified that he identified a photo from the law enforcement six-pack, but
did not testify which photo he identified. (Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.2-17.) Ms. Zito was pretty
confident, but not 100 percent certain of her identification. (Trial Tr., p.175, Ls.16-25.)
Detective Zacary Parlin testified that Ms. Zito, Mr. Siegwein, and Ms. Curry chose the second
photo in the line-up, the one Ms. Dempsey identified as herself. (Trial Tr., p.378, L.18 - p.379,
L.10.)
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case and placing the weight of her office behind the State's witnesses' testimony.

The

prosecutor improperly stirred the jury's passions and prejudices by telling it that it must connect
the dots and convict Ms. Dempsey because it was in the jury's hands-it was responsible for
keeping the community safe. In light of the weak evidence in this case, and the egregious
prosecutorial misconduct in which the prosecutor appealed to the jury's passions and prejudices,
bolstered the testimony of three of its witnesses, provided the jury with her personal opinions and
disparaged the defense, she urged the jury to convict Ms. Dempsey absent proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, Ms. Dempsey has shown the replete prosecutorial misconduct actually affected
the outcome of the trial. See Miller, No. 46517, p.4. 6 She respectfully requests that this Court
vacate her judgment of conviction and remand her case for a new trial.

III.

The District Court Erred In Ordering Restitution
A.

Introduction
Ms. Dempsey asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution in

the amount of $2,520 for two old smart phones and two old laptops7, for awarding $6,261.06 for
jewelry belonging to Mrs. Grinder-Ash, and for awarding $1,135 for an anticipated future loss by
Ms. Cowell. Ms. Dempsey asserts that the district court's decision is not based on substantial,
competent evidence where the State failed to establish a current market value for the electronics
and jewelry and where future losses are not compensable.

6

Ms. Dempsey submits, because she has met the higher Miller standard, she has also met the
Perry standard of a reasonable possibility this error affected the outcome. Perry, 150 Idaho at
226.
7
Although Ms. Dempsey will categorize the two computers as "laptops" for ease of reference,
the items were actually one laptop computer and one GPad computer. (Aug., p.116.)
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B.

Standard Of Review
"It is generally recognized ... that courts of criminal jurisdiction have no power or

authority to direct reparations or restitution to a crime victim in the absence of a statutory
provision to such effect." State v. Gonzales, 144 Idaho 775, 777 (Ct. App. 2007). A district
court's exercise of discretion in ordering restitution is guided by the limitations set forth in
LC.§ 19-5304(7). State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011). On appeal, the factual findings
of the district court will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v.
Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013).

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. The legislature has established that
economic losses are to be determined by a civil preponderance of the evidence standard.
LC.§ 19-5304(6); State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 38 (Ct. App. 2002).
Idaho Code§ 19-5304(6) provides:
Restitution orders shall be entered by the court at the time of sentencing or such
later date as deemed necessary by the court. Economic loss shall be based upon
the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by the prosecutor,
defendant, victim or presentence investigator. Each party shall have the right to
present such evidence as may be relevant to the issue of restitution, and the court
may consider such hearsay as may be contained in the presentence report, victim
impact statement or otherwise provided to the court.
LC.§ 19-5304(6).
When considering the general restitution statute, the Idaho Court of Appeals has
explained that "the amount of the award must be supported by substantial evidence" and is to be
determined "based upon the civil preponderance of the evidence standard." In re Doe, 146 Idaho
277, 284 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). LC. § 19-5304(2) states that "[r]estitution shall be
ordered for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers." "Webster's Dictionary defines
the word 'actually'" as something 'existing in fact or reality' and in contrast with the words
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'potential and possible."'

State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 889 (2013) (holding evidence

regarding lost future wages is a speculative, rather than an actual economic loss).
At the restitution hearing, defense counsel clarified that Ms. Dempsey was stipulating to
pay Mr. and Mrs. Bulgin $6,350.20 and Mr. and Mrs. Teti $5,369.95. (11/5/18 Tr., p.748, Ls.616; p.749, Ls.14-18; p.752, Ls.2-19.)

C.

The District Court Erred By Ordering Restitution For Future Losses
Joanne Colwell was called to testify. (11/5/18 Tr., p.756, Ls.1-8.) She testified that she

had calculated the value of her jewelry at the time it was taken. (11/5/18 Tr., p.758, L.13 p.760, L.7.) She testified that she requested $1,135 because she intended to obtain a reissuance
of a stock certificate and three certified marriage licenses, but had not yet done so. (11/5/18
Tr., p.760, L.8 - p.762, L.2.) The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $13,184. 8
(11/5/18 Tr., p.768, Ls.7-10.)
However, under LC. § 19-5304(2), "[r]estitution shall be ordered for any economic loss
which the victim actually suffers."

Restitution will not be awarded for speculative nor

prospective losses. See Straub, 153 Idaho at 890 (holding lost wages were based on the possible
future wages and were thus inapposite to "actually suffered" economic loss compensable under
the statute).
Because Ms. Colwell had not incurred the loss as she had not yet purchased reissued
certificates, the district court erred by awarding restitution for the cost of reissuance.

8

The district court initially said it would order restitution consistent with State's Restitution Exh.
3, minus $450 for a belt buckle Ms. Colwell testified had been returned to her. (11/5/18
Tr., p.763, Ls.10-25; p.768, Ls.7-10.) However, the court neglected to remove the $450 and
ordered restitution in the amount of$13,684. (Aug., p.113.) Thereafter, the district court issued
an amended order correcting the amount of restitution for Joann Colwell to $13,184. (Aug.,
p.118.)
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D.

The District Court Erred In Ordering Restitution For The Electronics Where The State
Failed To Establish The Market Value Of The Electronics With Substantial And
Competent Evidence
According to the specific language within the restitution statute, economic loss "includes,

but is not limited to, the value of property taken ... and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses .
. ." LC. § 19-5304(1)(a). Value means "the market value of the property at the time and place of
the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property
within a reasonable time after the crime." LC. §§ 19-5304(1)(c), 18-2402(1 l)(a). "When the
value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, its value shall be deemed to be one thousand dollars
($1,000) or less." LC. § 18-2402(c).
In State v. Smith, the Court of Appeals clarified the restitution definitions, holding, " the
'market value' of consumer goods is the reasonable price at which the owner would hold those
goods out for sale to the general public, as opposed to the 'cost ofreplacement' which would be
the cost for the owner to reacquire the same goods." 144 Idaho 687, 693 (Ct. App. 2007). In
determining the restitution owed by a defendant, the district court may consider the value of the
property stolen, which is to be calculated according to its "market value," so long as
that value can be satisfactorily ascertained. Id; see also State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 544
(Ct. App. 1989); LC. § 18-2402(1 l)(a); LC. § 19-5304(1)(a).
Ms. Christie Batruel testified. (11/5/18 Tr., p.768, Ls.15-20.) She requested restitution
for jewelry, two smart phones, two laptop computers, and a stick of Old Spice deodorant. 9
(11/5/18 Tr., p. 770, L.9 - p. 771, L.25; State's Restitution Exh. 4, electronic Exhibit file, p.184.)
Ms. Batruel had done research on the internet to determine the actual value of the jewelry at the
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time it was taken. (11/5/18 Tr., p.771, L.23 - p.772, L.9.) She testified as to the purchase price
of the two phone and two computers. (11/5/18 Tr., p.772, Ls.10-12.) The electronic items were
all approximately one year old. (11/5/18 Tr., p.772, Ls.13-24.)
Ms. Batruel could not identify the market value of the used electronics.

(11/5/18

Tr., p.772, L.10 - p.773, L.22.) The State submitted no information as to the value of any of the
used electronics, instead asking the district court to determine the value based on the purchase
price of the electronic items purchased a year or several years ago. (11/5/18 Tr., p.787, Ls.5-17;
p.788, Ls.1-7.) The district court found that the witness misunderstood the compensable value of
the electronics. (11/5/18 Tr., p.789, L.20 - p.790, L.3.) Instead, the district court reduced the
purchase price for the two smart phones and the two laptop computers by 20%, estimating that
the items had depreciated and that 20% of their original purchase price would be a reasonable
current fair market value. (11/5/18 Tr., p.789, L.20 - p.790, L.21; Aug., p.116.) The district
court ordered $10,274 in restitution to Ms. Batruel and Mr. Ullrich.

(Aug., pp.113, 116.)

Ms. Dempsey submits that this was error, as the figure determined to be the market value is not
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
The district court ultimately concluded that the purchase price for the electronic items
minus 20% was the fair market value. (11/5/18 Tr., p.789, L.20-p.790, L.21.) However, such a
calculation is not based upon what may be awarded pursuant to the statute. The district court's
mathematical calculation failed to determine what is a reasonable price at which the victim could
hold those items out for sale to the general public. See Smith, 144 Idaho at 693. The pertinent
language from the statute requires that the value of the property must be the market value of the

9

Ms. Dempsey's counsel stipulated to the $4 for the Old Spice deodorant and $50 for the new
door locks. (Tr., p.789, Ls.2-7.)
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property at the time and place of the crime. LC. §§ 19-5304(1)(c), 18-2402(1 l)(a). The State
did not present evidence as to this value, nor did the State present evidence as to the cost of
replacement of the electronic items within a reasonable time after the burglary. (See 11/5/18
Tr., generally.) Thus, the State failed to meet its burden of proving the restitution amount.
Where the evidence supporting the $2,520 for the used electronic items is simply the district
court's best guess at depreciation of electronic items, the evidence is not substantial.
Accordingly, the district court erred by ordering Ms. Dempsey to pay $2,520 for the used
electronics. Because the State did not sufficiently prove that the victims' losses for the electronic
items was $3,150 minus 20% estimated depreciation, this portion of the restitution award must
be vacated.

E.

The District Court Erred In Ordering Restitution For The Jewelry Where The State Failed
To Establish The Market Value Of The Jewelry With Substantial And Competent
Evidence
The district court determined that Ms. Dempsey owed Mr. Ash and Mrs. Ash-Grinde

$6,261.06 for the jewelry that was taken but never recovered. (Aug., pp.113, 115.) However,
Mrs. Grinde-Ash could not identify the market value of the jewelry, nor was the cost of
replacement identified. (See 11/5/18 Tr., p.795, L.6 - p.814, L.9) The jewelry items had not
been reappraised since they were purchased. (11/5/18 Tr., p.809, Ls.12-14; p.811, Ls.11-15.)
Mrs. Ash-Grinde's best guess was that the value of the items when stolen was something
between the sold and the retail price. (11/5/18 Tr., p.813, Ls.15-20.) The State failed to present
substantial and competent evidence of the value of the jewelry (some of it was nearly fifteen
years old) at the time it was taken, and instead simply submitted receipts for when the items were
purchased. (State's Restitution Exh. 5; 11/5/18 Tr., p.795, Ls.6-16; p.805, Ls.8-10; p.806, Ls.1217.) When the district court sought information on the market value, it was unable to acquire the

29

information from the State or the owner, and the State simply asked the court to calculate an
amount as it saw fit. (11/5/18 Tr., p.814, L.21 - p.815, L.5.) The district court advised the
parties that it would review the documents and come up with its own total value of the specific
pieces of jewelry.

(11/5/18 Tr., p.816, Ls.4-15.)

Ultimately, the district court ordered the

purchase price of the jewelry, none of which was brand new and some of which was purchased
nearly fifteen years ago. (See Aug., pp.113, 115.) Ms. Dempsey submits that this was error, as
the figure determined to be the market value is not supported by substantial evidence in the
record (see Section D). Where the $6,261.06 awarded was simply the purchase price, the market
value of the items has not been shown by substantial and competent evidence. Because the State
did not sufficiently prove that the victims' loss for the jewelry was $6,261.06, this portion of the
restitution award must be vacated.

F.

The District Court Erred In Ordering Restitution For The Chanel Purse, The Japanese
And The American Coin Collections, And Three Open Bottles Of Perfume Where The
State Failed To Establish The Market Value Of The Items With Substantial And
Competent Evidence
Ms. Yukie Cook testified. (12/4/18 Tr., p.825, L.1 - p.862, L.5.) She requested, inter

alia, restitution for jewelry, jewelry boxes, a Chanel purse, two coin collections, cash, a

dictionary, and perfumes totaling $112,350.

(12/4/18 Tr., p.825, L.1 - p.862, L.5; 12/4/18

State's Restitution Exh. 1.) Ms. Cook testified with the assistance of a Japanese translator, and
her testimony was inconsistent as to whether the amounts she was requesting were for the new
purchase price of the items or whether she understood that any restitution would only be ordered
for the fair market value of the items at the time they were taken.

(12/4/18 Tr., p.827, L.8 -

p.829, L.16; p.833, L.1-7; p.835, Ls.1-20; p.842, Ls.10-21.) She testified that the purchase price
of the Chanel purse was $3,500. (12/4/18 Tr., p.839, L.16 - p.840, L.2.) The Chanel purse was
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approximately ten years old. (12/4/18 Tr., p.839, Ls.16-23.) The State submitted no information
as to the market value of a ten-year-old Chanel purse. (See 12/4/18 Tr., generally; 12/4/18
State’s Restitution Exhs. 1, 2.) Ms. Cook testified that she paid $100 for each of the five bottles
of perfume, but three of the bottles had been opened and used. (12/4/18 Tr., p.846, L.8 – p.847,
L.9.) The State submitted no information as to the market value of three bottles of opened and
used perfume. (See 12/4/18 Tr., generally; 12/4/18 State’s Restitution Exhs. 1, 2.) Ms. Cook
testified about her Japanese coin collection dating back to pre-WWII, which she valued at
$10,000, but she could not describe the coins or their amounts specifically, other than to say that
they were in a small, clutch handbag and she valued them at $10,000 because they were old
coins. (12/4/18 Tr., p.840, Ls.3-24; p.843, L.2 – p.844, L.12.) When Ms. Cook testified about
her American coin collection, which she also valued at $10,000, she could only recall some
unrolled American fifty-cent pieces in a four- to six-inch wide small, clutch handbag. (12/4/18
Tr., p.840, L.20 – p.841, Ls.3-17; p.844, L.13 – p.845, L.20.)

The State submitted no

information in support of its restitution and failed to specify what coins were in each collection
or any information as to the market value of any of the coins in the collections. (See 12/4/18
Tr., generally; 12/4/18 State’s Restitution Exhs. 1, 2.) The State failed to present substantial and
competent evidence that the small clutch containing unrolled American fifty-cent pieces was
worth $10,000. The district court ordered $84,000 in restitution to Ms. Cook. (Aug., pp.11314.) Ms. Dempsey asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding restitution in
the amount of $23,800 for the items identified herein where the State failed to establish the
market value of the items with substantial and competent evidence.
Because the State failed to present substantial, competent evidence in support of the
restitution award, Ms. Dempsey submits that the restitution award must be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Dempsey respectfully requests that this Court vacate her conviction and remand this
matter for a new trial. Ms. Dempsey submits that the conviction for Count XII Grand Theft
must be reduced to a misdemeanor. Ms. Dempsey further submits that the restitution award
must be vacated and the case remanded for a new restitution calculation which omits the
amount owed for the items identified in Sections (C-F) ($33,716.06).
DATED this 15th day of July, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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